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Executive summary
•    Rule of law promotion is integral 
to peacebuilding, but not always 
well integrated
•    It is important to distinguish 
between technical delivery of rule 
of law assistance and access 
to justice as perceived by the 
population 
•    Rule of law promotion and 
transitional justice may be 
complementary, or competitive
•    Despite emphasis on the formal 
sector, informal justice processes 
are often most accessible to the 
vast majority
•    Such informal processes may be 
transformed both by conflict and 
by peacebuilding activities
•    Emphasis on state institutions 
in rule of law promotion can 
inadvertently undermine equal 
access to justice
•    Given these challenges, the 
international community faces 
serious dilemmas about whom  
to engage, and particularly 
whether to engage the informal 
sector at all
Just peace? peacebuilding 
and rule of law in africa
Lessons for policymakers
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introduction
This policy paper encapsulates the key findings of a 
research project undertaken by the Centre on Human 
Rights in Conflict (CHRC) of the University of East 
London School of Law on rule of law in African countries 
emerging from violent conflict, funded by the British 
Academy. The CHRC commissioned a range of experts 
and practitioners from around the world to examine and 
assess contemporary international efforts at promoting 
rule of law reform in peacebuilding operations and 
development assistance. Country studies examined in 
depth the experiences of a number of African countries—
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan—while thematic 
studies examined rule of law as part of peacebuilding in 
comparative perspective, the role of traditional justice, and 
specific aspects of rule of law in the African context. These 
studies will be published as a book entitled Just Peace? 
Peacebuilding and rule of law in Africa.1 
Clearly, the range of experiences with rule of law 
promotion in countries emerging from conflict in Africa is 
vast, and there is no single set of prescriptions that could 
possibly emerge from a comparative study of this sort.
However, it is nonetheless possible to identify a number of 
crosscutting themes, patterns, and recurring challenges 
that appear in many of the countries examined in this 
volume and elsewhere on the continent.  This paper 
seeks to elaborate upon those key themes, and then turn 
to insights which may be gleaned to develop guidance 
for policymakers.  Again, there is no one-size-fits-all 
prescription to be made, but recent experience provides 
some insights into risks, alternatives, and emergent policy 
practice, and we elaborate upon these.
Key themes
Rule of law in peacebuilding: integral 
but not always integrated
Rule of law is now viewed as integral to peacebuilding 
processes, and indeed is increasingly included in 
peacekeeping operations as well. Peacekeeping 
operations, such as the United Nations Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) or the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), have distinct rule 
of law divisions or pillars. Rule of law programming is 
also a priority for development organizations such as 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and many bilateral donors.   This has created an 
increasingly elaborate set of programming in development, 
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding activities in post-conflict 
contexts.  However, rule of law programming may not 
always be fully integrated in peacebuilding processes, 
as efforts at transitional security arrangements such as 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-
combatants (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) may 
proceed in isolation from, and often prior to, rule of law 
promotion.  In many countries, police and prison reform 
are treated as matters of security reform, but of course 
the justice sector cannot function if convicted persons 
cannot be incarcerated, and will be subject to criticism if 
individuals are held in inhumane conditions without trial for 
long periods of time due to lack of resources and capacity, 
as in Rwanda.
Our research demonstrates that despite the development 
of integrated peacebuilding missions to provide better 
coordination, coordination is generally better developed 
at headquarters level than in the field.  There are not only 
gaps within activities, but ‘cherrypicking’ can generate 
excessive emphasis on a particular area, or even 
duplication, as actors choose the rule of law activities that 
are the most appealing.  
Technical rule of law assistance vs.
 justice as perceived by the populace
Evidence from in-country interviews demonstrates 
a persistent gap between the delivery of rule of law 
assistance according to programme guidelines and 
the perception of access to justice held by individuals.  
For example the impact from the reconstruction of 
infrastructure may be limited to urban areas and the 
training of legal staff may be concentrated in large 
population centres. Often, the language of formal courts 
is inaccessible to much of the population, both because it 
is highly technical or formalized, or a completely different 
language, Furthermore, the process required is generally 
very lengthy and bureaucratic, and the cost of obtaining 
legal counsel, where it is available, may be prohibitive. 
Lack of functioning or diligent police forces can also 
impede the collection of evidence. All of these phenomena 
can contribute to a sense amongst many that the courts 
are not fair, or are simply not for them.  
The gap between programming and perceptions of justice 
may prove difficult to address with mere expansion of 
programming, since any change relies upon a change in 
beliefs embedded over a long period of time, which may 
also be promoted by those who benefit from the status 
quo. 
Among those who do view the formal system as a means 
to achieve justice, expectations may be unrealistically 
high, which can put added stress on the system.  If they 
feel that bias and corruption are not being dealt with 
quickly enough, this may affect their perception of the 
performance of the government as a whole and increase 
dissatisfaction, which could potentially be destabilizing.  
1  The CHRC gratefully acknowledges the support of the   
British Academy for this project under larger grant   
number LRG-44998.
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Finally, rule of law promotion is not a mere 
technical activity: it is also a polit ical one.  It 
involves not only training of staff in technical 
standards, but potentially removing corrupt 
individuals from their posts, reducing benefits to 
and discretion of officials in the legal or security 
sectors, and changing substantive law in ways 
which may be politically contentious. 
Rule of law promotion and transitional justice 
efforts: complementary and contradictory
 
The relation between attempts to promote 
rule of law and efforts at transitional justice is 
increasingly complex.  While a few years ago, 
the conventional wisdom often assumed that 
rule of law efforts would bolster accountabil ity 
efforts by simply providing or strengthening the 
institutional framework or culture of law, or that 
transitional justice would necessarily enhance 
rule of law efforts by offering a demonstration 
of justice in action, the reality is not quite so 
simple. In fact, transitional justice efforts at 
the national level can complicate rule of law 
efforts, not only by potentially destabil izing a 
fragile situation, but by drawing off material and 
human resources, and potentially polit icizing 
how people view the idea of justice in 
countries lacking a history of transparent and 
responsive institutions of justice. Transitional 
justice processes may create unreasonable 
expectations of the judicial system, as where 
truth commissions recommend domestic 
prosecutions which new or weak courts 
cannot handle. Similarly, in those places where 
traditional justice processes are in use, they 
may complicate state-based or internationally 
supported transitional justice processes, and 
ordinary citizens may not understand how these 
relate to one another or to the (re)construction 
of a formal judicial sector. In a post-conflict 
context, traditional justice processes may also 
be altered beyond recognition, or co-opted for 
specific polit ical purposes. 
Informal and non-state processes are most 
accessible for the vast majority, but are also 
problematic
In many states in Africa, and not only those 
emerging from violent conflict, it is well known 
that the majority of the population have litt le 
or no access to the formal justice sector.  In 
such situations, rule of law programmers must 
work in the context of the operation of non-
state providers of justice and conflict resolution.  
This is unavoidable, but as discussed below, 
policymakers and practitioners need to 
consider whether they work with or around 
these providers, as well as the l ikelihood that 
such actors wil l view them with suspicion.  In 
many instances, non-state justice is the only 
type available, so it would be unwise to simply 
ignore it.  Nonetheless, it often operates in 
ways which are not transparent, may be biased 
against women and youth, and may impose 
disproportionate or human rights-violating 
sanctions.
Informal and non-state processes may be 
transformed not only by conflict, but by 
peacebuilding processes
However, while the majority of the population 
in a country such as Sierra Leone or Liberia 
may continue to rely on non-state providers of 
justice and conflict resolution after a conflict 
ends, the processes, and the relationship 
between the population and those providers, 
may have fundamentally changed.  Traditional 
chiefs may have lost some authority because 
of their actions during the war, and youths 
may also demand that elders cede them some 
authority.  This does not mean that traditional 
practices disappear, but rather that they may 
have changed in subtle or dramatic ways, and 
also, potentially, that they might be open to 
reform efforts, discussed below. Peacebuilding 
processes inevitably alter the formal judicial 
sector but what is often less apparent is 
how such processes may also alter informal 
processes, whether or not external actors 
engage directly with them.  They may, first, 
over time serve to l imit the power of informal 
justice or conflict resolution processes (through 
formal legal l imitations or offering state-based 
justice processes as an alternative).  Second, 
as discussed below, peacebuilding processes 
may seek to engage informal processes more 
directly, promoting their reform, or even 
generating demands for their reform   
amongst the populace.
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Institutional emphasis in rule of law programming can 
inadvertently undermine equal access to justice
The emphasis by external actors upon (re)
building institutions of the state, including those 
of the justice (and related security) sector, 
reflects an understandable desire to stabil ize 
states emerging from conflict, prior to the 
promotion of democratic competition through 
elections, and as part of an exit strategy for 
the international community. However, this 
contestation can privi lege some groups over 
others in ways that undermine the legitimacy of 
institutions of justice.  Most obviously, support 
to formal state institutions is l ikely to reinforce 
an urban/rural or rich/poor divide, with those 
unable to access state institutions viewing 
them with suspicion.  Or, alternately, one or 
more groups which emerged as relatively more 
powerful from the conflict or peace settlement 
may dominate those institutions, or the 
institutions may become sites of contestation 
for those who seek to emerge stronger from the 
peacebuilding process.  Where such divisions 
emerge along ethnic, but also political, l ines, 
the potential for conflict, and the stress upon 
fragile institutions of justice, should be evident. 
Where institutions of rule of law appear unwill ing 
or unable to hold the powerful to account, 
the credibil ity of these institutions wil l suffer.  
This was the case in Sierra Leone, where the 
Anti-Corruption Commission was active, but 
heavily criticised for failure to pursue high-level 
allegations of corruption, resulting in the firing of 
its then-head in late 2007. 
Dilemma for the international community:   
whom to engage?
In l ight of the potential reinforcement of bias 
and privi lege, or the creation of new biases, 
the international community faces challenges in 
deciding whom to engage, and how.  In Rwanda, 
the government’s narrative about ethnicity 
means that donors are unable or unwill ing to 
query the composition of security forces, which 
are disproportionately comprised of ethnic Tutsi, 
with obvious implications for the justice sector.  
Donors, of course, require at a bare minimum 
state permission to engage in programming, and 
ideally seek positive engagement. In the DRC, 
presidential influence over the judiciary clearly 
undermines efforts to promote a transparent, 
depoliticised judiciary, but has been tacitly 
supported by donors.  In Rwanda, the gacaca 
process does not address Tutsi, only Hutu, 
accused. UK programmers in Sierra Leone 
have adapted their programming over time 
to increasingly engage traditional authorities.  
However, external actors may also find it diff icult 
to understand the social and political roles 
played by groups such as secret societies in 
parts of West Africa, much less to engage them. 
In parts of Sudan, the government itself is 
providing significant support to rule of law 
promotion in tandem with UNDP, even as 
the government continues to be accused 
of complicity in war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in the Darfur region in the 
country. Where states seek to hijack rule of 
law promotion, bias it, or simply engage in 
it in apparent bad faith, donors may well be 
concerned that their assistance wil l be misused 
or serve as cover, but wil l l ikely want to continue 
to engage somehow, to increase access to 
justice to people in post-conflict countries. 
International actors may find it diff icult in 
practice to confront corruption, where it involves 
challenging the very actors whose cooperation 
and consent they require.  The persistence 
of corruption, and the toleration of it by 
international actors, may affect the legitimacy 
not only of state institutions but also of the 
international actors.   
Policy insights and 
recommendations
Integrate relevant programming on the ground 
and address the entire justice sector
International assistance should be part of a 
common rule of law strategy led by national 
counterparts.  The UN should develop a unified 
rule of law strategy for all of its departments, 
funds and agencies, while coordinating better 
with national and other international actors. 
Such programming could be guided by, among 
other tools, DPKO and OHCHR Rule of Law 
Indicators.  Programmers should also engage 
in proper monitoring and evaluation and adapt 
programming accordingly. Such integration may 
take place through integrated missions, but may 
also be bolstered by better-coordinated planning 
and reporting amongst all programmers in the 
rule of law sector.
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 Manage expectations and build    
a culture of legal literacy
Reconstructing the formal judicial sector and 
rebuilding rule of law in a post-conflict situation 
is a lengthy process.  People accustomed to a 
corrupt and abusive justice sector may continue 
to mistrust new and reformed institutions. 
Education and outreach is essential so that 
individuals understand the legal process, and 
respond to their sense that the formal sector is 
ineffectual or any misperceptions and mistrust. 
Education about rights may help to create 
a positive demand for rule of law and active 
support for rule of law reform.   
Assess impact in terms of access to  
justice (perceived and real), not only  
technical benchmarks
There is a need to assess the impact of rule of 
law policies and programming in terms of their 
impact upon access to justice as experienced 
and perceived by the people in a given society, 
not solely technical benchmarks. This is not 
to say that practitioners do not understand 
the importance of access to justice or that 
technical benchmarks are not also important: 
a programme to train members of the judiciary 
which does not engage anyone would clearly 
fail on any measure.  Although advances such 
as the rebuilding of infrastructure and training 
of new members of the legal profession are 
significant accomplishments in themselves, 
they may have limited impact on members of 
the populace in rural areas.  However, efforts to 
expand the pool of legal aid-type workers and 
to ensure that magistrates are not only located 
in each district but travel around them to hear 
cases, may offer some possibil ity of greater 
access to an otherwise inaccessible formal 
sector. Here, a reorientation of programming 
away from delivering some rule of law outputs 
to a consideration of access to justice impacts, 
which can already be seen in the evolution of 
programming, is critical.
Engage the non-state sector more  
extensively if cautiously
Our research indicates a need to engage the 
non-state or quasi-state justice sector more 
extensively. This is a potentially complex and 
fraught undertaking, requiring engagement with 
rules and processes which are l ikely not to 
be codified, which vary over time and across 
regions and communities, and practitioners 
who may speak very different languages to 
those engaged in programming, in both a 
l inguistic and a technical sense.  Because 
roles as practitioners of traditional justice 
or conflict resolution confer status, and may 
include benefits of tribute, fees, and fines, the 
interposition of external rule of law promoters 
may not be particularly welcomed by such 
practitioners.  It may more generally be viewed 
with suspicion as culturally intrusive and 
insensitive, where programmers are most l ikely 
to come from other, developed, and even former 
colonizer nations.  Further, any engagement 
must proceed with extreme caution, lest external 
programmers inadvertently support or promote 
the violation of basic human rights.
In order to engage more effectively, 
policymakers need to understand the complexity 
of the informal sector, including differences 
amongst the multiplicity of mechanisms, such 
as colonial native courts, or informal traditional 
justice and harmful traditional practices.  Where 
dual systems of formal and informal processes 
are in place, standards regarding crimes, 
punishments, and discrimination should be made 
consistent, and appropriate channels of appeal 
from the informal to the informal sector should 
be created or ensured. 
•   Be sensitive to national and international legal 
standards, and to the fluidity of custom
There is a risk that programmers of rule of 
law, rightly recognizing the l imitations of the 
impact of their engagement with the formal, 
state-run judicial sector, wil l rapidly engage 
with myriad “traditional” actors without 
sufficient guidance and caution. Thus British 
programmers have come to recognize that in 
Sierra Leone there is a need to engage, and as 
they term it, sensitize, traditional actors about 
the l imitations of international human rights 
and Sierra Leonean law.  This can only be 
achieved through partnership with local actors 
and proper research, to both understand the 
full range and content of traditional practices, 
to compare them with international and national 
legal standards, and possibly to promote reform, 
rather than rejection or blind acceptance, 
of traditional dispute resolution practice. In 
particular, programmers should be sensitive to 
the presence of potentially harmful practices, 
such as trial by ordeal, where engagement and 
dialogue is needed in order to promote genuine 
change from within the community.  Strong 
public condemnation or prohibition may simply 
drive such practices underground.  Greater 
knowledge does not guarantee acceptance of 
reform efforts by traditional authorities who have 
potentially the most to lose, although where 
programmers build strong partnerships with local 
actors and seek to develop relationships of trust 
with traditional authorities, such acceptance 
might be more likely. 
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•   Support community-based activities in  
parallel to informal and formal activities
Mediation and arbitration programmes can 
provide mechanisms within local communities 
for individuals to resolve disputes without 
relying upon courts or traditional authorities, 
and indeed might be viewed as bridging the gap 
between formal and informal justice and conflict 
resolution processes.  Rule of law programmers 
should consider expanding support to such 
programmes where appropriate.
Address the risk of institutional bias or capture
The perception of access to justice is affected 
further by the impact of control by a small 
segment of the population over state delivery 
of justice.  In the context of post-conflict 
countries, whether the conflict was divisive 
ideologically, ethnically, or on some other basis, 
the post-conflict settlement may have clear 
winners and losers, whether it arises through 
negotiated settlement or largely military victory. 
Programmers must therefore be sensitive to 
political dynamics and elite manipulation.
Identify and engage relevant partners
The lack of polit ical wil l in state structures to 
promote reform does not mean that reform is 
impossible.  There are a range of incentives 
that should be considered in any plan for rule of 
law assistance to increase cooperation such as 
the provision of funds for infrastructure, salary 
stipends or support to national experts which 
bring immediate benefit to the host country 
or meetings of the international diplomatic 
community that focus international attention 
on rule of law.  While many state officials may 
resist change, states and bureaucracies are 
not monoliths, so programmers should seek to 
identify and engage individuals who are more 
amenable to change.
areas for future research
As much as the studies and this volume have 
revealed about rule of law programming in 
specific countries, and about the trends and 
limitations of internationally driven rule of law 
promotion activities in post-conflict situations, 
there remains much more to be learned through 
future research.  What follows are a number of 
areas in which further research is needed to 
assess and assist international and domestic 
rule of law promotion.
Further research on rule of law promotion 
activities in practice
Programming on rule of law in each of the 
countries examined here engaged with, or 
avoided engaging, an active informal justice 
sector.  However, what is sti l l needed is a 
systemic overview, a fuller review of where rule 
of law promotion activities engage the informal 
sector, country by country, and where they do 
not.
This study primarily examined rule of law 
promotion activities by the UN, and to a lesser 
degree specific donors such as the UK, and 
of a few international NGOs. However, the UN 
is not the only significant actor in the field, 
although it is an important one.  Future research 
could engage in similar in-depth cross-country 
comparisons of programming by the EU, and a 
wider range of bilateral donors and NGOs.
Finally, there is a need for broad cross-
regional comparison, to identify similarities 
and differences between programming in 
Africa and programming in Latin America, Asia, 
and Europe.  Scholarly work can also bolster 
knowledge about the efficacy of a range of 
mechanisms, such as legal aid, and support to 
mediation processes.
Rule of law programming by a range of 
international actors, as part of peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding, and development activities 
has grown in scope and complexity in recent 
years, and this trend appears l ikely to continue.  
Scholarly analysis has a critical role to play in 
assessing it, and using assessments to help 
inform improvements in policymaking.
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Evaluate the impact of donor priorities
Future research should examine the effects of the 
prioritization of certain aspects of law reform over 
others.  Specifically, our research raises the question 
that programming in “popular” areas such as gender 
may be emphasized to the detriment of other 
programming.  Similarly, it would appear that rule of 
law reform preferences criminal over civil law.  Further 
research is needed to determine whether this is indeed 
the case, and whether programming in this area could 
prevent land tenure and inheritance disputes, which are 
potentially destabilizing in a post-conflict context. .    
Make research into traditional mechanisms accessible 
to policymakers
It is essential that research on traditional and non-
state mechanisms of justice and conflict resolution 
be conducted, but, perhaps equally importantly, that 
their insights be accessible to policymakers.  There 
is a great deal of exceedingly good research, much 
of it by anthropologists, but it often does not reach 
policymakers, or is not taken up by them.  This may 
be due to is publication in specialised journals which 
policymakers do not seek out, or use of specialised 
jargon which they may find difficult.  In any event, in-
depth research on traditional mechanisms could be 
made more accessible to those taking programming 
decisions about whether to engage traditional actors, 
and if so, how, in a given situation. 
Such knowledge would help to support the review 
(already being initiated in some countries) of the 
compatibility of traditional practices with international 
human rights and international humanitarian law. 
However, any such review must also seek to identify 
aspects of international obligations that 
are universalizable/translatable to a range of 
traditional actors. 
Engage in research on support to legal aid and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms  
While there is some evidence from the cases that 
legal aid, mediation and arbitration play positive 
roles in ensuring the peaceful resolution of disputes 
and potentially citizen engagement with the justice 
sector, closer study and assessment are needed.  The 
findings of such research may help to promote better 
programming to support resolution of disputes outside 
of both the formal and informal sectors, and in particular 
perhaps to address a range of civil disputes.     
Key recommendations: 
a summary
Policymakers and practitioners should:
•   Integrate relevant programming on the ground and 
address the entire justice sector
•   Manage expectations and build a culture   
of legal literacy
•   Assess impact in terms of access to justice 
(perceived and real), not just technical benchmarks
•   Engage the non-state sector more extensively if 
cautiously
•  Address the risk of institutional bias or capture
•  Identify and engage relevant partners
Policy-oriented researchers should:
•   Further review rule of law promotion  
activities in practice
•  Evaluate the impact of donor priorities
•   Make research into traditional mechanisms 
accessible to policymakers
•   Engage in research on support to legal aid   
and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
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